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Abstract. Security patterns capture the experiences of experts, allowing novices to 
rely on expert knowledge and solve security problems in a more systematic and 
structured way. So far, literature provides many examples of security patterns for 
object-oriented systems. However, no attempt has been made to document security 
patterns for multiagent systems. In this paper we present a set of patterns for secure 
agent systems that, currently, consisting of four patterns.    
1 Introduction  
Over the last two decades multiagent systems are used in different domains of the 
human society ranging from auctions [Byd02] to military systems [Tid99]. As a 
result, security plays an important role in the development of such systems, since 
security failures might lead to many dangers such as financial loss or disclosure of 
sensitive information. 
It has been argued [Dev00] that security concerns should be addressed at every 
stage of the development process. However, security is usually considered after the 
definition of a multiagent system [Mou00]. Such second-thought security leads to 
systems afflicted with security vulnerabilities [Sta99].   
One of the main reasons for this situation is that non-security experts are involved 
in the development of systems that require knowledge of security.  The application of 
patterns within the security domain can provide a promising solution to this problem, 
since  patterns are effective means to improve security awareness and know-how. A 
security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that arises in specific 
contexts and presents a well-proven generic scheme for its solution. Moreover, the 
advantages of security patterns are that novices can rely on expert knowledge and 
solve problems in a more systematic and structured way.   
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The overall goal of this paper is to present a set of patterns that can be applied 
during the development of secure agent-based systems. In particular, we present four 
patterns. The AGENCY GUARD that provides a single, non-bypassable, point of 
access to the agency, the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR that provides authentication 
services to the agency, the SANDBOX that allows the agency to execute non-
authorised agents in a secure manner, and the ACCESS CONROLER that allows the 
agency to provide access to its resources according to its security policy.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates and introduces 
the set of patterns. Section 3 provides a roadmap of the proposed set and Section 4 
contains the patterns themselves.  In Section 5 we illustrate, with the aid of an 
example, how the patterns can be applied during the development of agent-based 
systems. Finally, in Section 6 we present concluding remarks and direction for future 
work. 
2 Motivation 
The idea of developing a set of patterns or a pattern language for capturing proven 
security solutions is not new. Essmayr et al. [Ess97] introduced object-oriented access 
controls (OOAC) as a result of consequently applying the object-oriented paradigm 
for providing access controls in object and interoperable databases. Fernandez et al. 
[Fer93] proposed an authorisation model for object-oriented databases based on 
methods that correspond to access types in the access rule. Yoder and Barcalow 
[Yod97] proposed a set of patterns that can be applied when developing security for 
an application and F. Lee Brown et al. [Bro99] proposed a pattern, called 
Authenticator, which performs authentication of a requesting process before deciding 
access to distributed objects. In addition, Fernandez and Pan proposed a pattern 
language for security models [Fer01]. Although this review is by no means complete1, 
most of the proposed security-related patterns and languages have been developed 
with a focus on object orientation. As stated by Fernandez and Pan [Fer01] “Our 
intent is to specify the accepted models as object-oriented patterns”.  
However, we can think of further focal points. In particular, we explore how the 
pattern paradigm can be applied during the development of agent-based systems. We 
believe that this is a worthwhile approach because in order to realize the potential of 
patterns and pattern languages in the development of agent-based systems, it is 
necessary to develop patterns and pattern languages that are specifically tailored to 
the development of agent-based systems using agent-oriented concepts.  
It is important to mention that many of the above-mentioned object-oriented 
security patterns show similarities with possible agent-oriented security patterns. 
These can be exploited in such a way that object-oriented patterns can be turned into 
agent patterns by identifying agent-specific additions (such as mobility, trust, or 
cooperation).. Although, examples of such exploitation cannot be found, the literature 
provides examples of social Object-Oriented patterns turned into Agent-Oriented 
patterns. For example, the Master-Slave pattern is listed as a pattern in both the 
                                                           
1 See http://www.securitypatterns.org for a complete review of security related patterns 
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POSA1 book [Bus01], as well as in Lange’s book [Lan98]. One distinction between 
these patterns is that the agent version of the pattern explicitly accounts for mobility 
[Deu01]. 
In this paper a set of four patterns is proposed that documents how an agency can 
be protected from malicious agents/agencies. The patterns are categorized into two 
main categories: patterns that deal with agency’s access issues, such as authentication, 
authorisation, and access control, and patterns that deal with communication issues of 
the agency, such as secure communication with other agencies, and repudiation. To 
model our patterns we employ agent-oriented concepts used in the development of 
agent based systems.  We feel this is necessary in order to make the patterns 
applicable to agent developers.  
Agent orientation is based around the concept of an agent. According to Yu [Yu95] 
an agent as a modelling construct demonstrates the following characteristics: 
 
− Intentionality. An agent can be modelled in terms of its intentional properties, 
such as goals, tasks, resources, beliefs and capabilities, without having to know 
its specific actions in terms of processes and steps. Although such a high level 
abstraction does not provide a complete specification for the implementation 
of the system, it provides developers the ability to model the functional and 
non-functional requirements of the system and distinguish between different 
alternatives at an initial stage of the development.  
− Autonomy. Agents are autonomous and can act independently. Because of the 
autonomy and independence agents are free to choose from a variety of 
different actions to perform. Using the concept of a goal helps to model this 
kind of behaviour since a goal implies that they might be many ways of 
achieving it.     
− Sociality. An agent most likely participates in relationships with other agents. 
In many traditional software engineering techniques, relationships are focused 
only on the exchange of data and intended functions. However, agent 
relationships are similar to human relationships and thus much more complex. 
Agent relationships involve conflicts amongst the relationships, multi-lateral 
relationships, and delegation of relationships.   
− Identity and boundary. Agent orientation does not necessarily bounds the 
modelling concept of an (abstract) agent to that of a physical agent. Agents can 
be described across a range of physicality and abstractness. For example, 
social agents can often create new abstractions such as roles, and positions to 
help to define each others responsibilities and functionality.    
 
We believe it is necessary to employ the above concepts when describing patterns for 
agents based systems. In doing so, we feel it is essential to describe the structure of a 
pattern not only in terms of the collaborations and message exchange between the 
participated agents but also in terms of the social dependencies and intentional 
attributes, such as goals and tasks, of the agents involved in the pattern. This way we 
can achieve a complete understanding of the pattern’s social and intentional 
dimensions, two factors very important on agent-based systems.   
To describe our patterns we employ the Tropos [Cas01] methodology that adopts 
concepts from the i* modelling framework [Yu95]. The main modelling concept is 
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that of an actor. An actor has intentional properties (Intentionality) and is autonomous 
(Autonomy). Thus, actors can be (social) agents (organisational, human or software), 
positions or roles (Identity and Boundary) that have social dependencies (Sociality) 
for defining the obligations of some actors (dependees) to other actors (dependers). 
The type of the dependency describes the nature of an agreement (called dependum) 
between dependee and depender. Goal dependencies represent delegation of 
responsibility for fulfilling a goal; task dependencies are used in situations where the 
dependee is required to perform a given activity; and resource dependencies require 
the dependee to provide a resource to the depender. By depending on others, actors 
are able to achieve goals that will be very difficult or impossible to achieve on their 
own. To make the above-mentioned concepts more clear, we consider a small 
example and we consider three actors:   
− Agency. An agency represents the environment in which an agent runs.  At 
least one agency must be active on each host computer to enable it to execute 
agents.  
− Security Manager. This actor represents an agent that is responsible for the 
security of the agency. 
− External Agent. It is an agent that does not belong to the Agency that wishes to 
access some information of the agency.    
Figure 1 represents the relationships between those actors in terms of their social 
dependencies. The main goal of the external agent is to access agency information. 
However, the agency will allow only authorised agents to access information. To 
fulfil the secure agency access goal the agency depends on the Security Manager. The 
security manager on the other hand, depends on the External Agents in order to obtain 
his access detail and be able to decide to allow or deny access to the agency 
information.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of representing social dependencies between different actors of 
the system 
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3. Pattern Roadmap 
In this paper we present only a subset of patterns in the context of secure agent 
environments. Figure 2 illustrates the relations between these patterns as well as 
existing patterns. The diagram is a slight variant of a UML class diagram (the analogy 
to UML breaks down sooner or later. For example, the pattern name often echoes the 
solution and can be about dynamic actions, while a class name tends to be a “thing”, 
not an action). Each box indicates a pattern where a solid-line box indicates a pattern 
discussed in this document and a dashed-line box indicates a related, existing pattern. 
The links denote UML notation. White triangles depict generalizations/ 
specialization and solid lines associations of type uses/ requires.  
  
 
 
Figure 2: Patterns Roadmap 
 
That way a hierarchy or a sequence of the patterns is build, respectively. The 
AGENCY GUARD is a variant of the EMBASSY and the PROXY patterns. Besides, 
the AGENCY GUARD is the starting point of applying the patterns described in this 
paper. It uses the SANDBOX pattern in order to restrict the actions of agents. 
Furthermore, the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR is required in order to ensure the 
authenticity of the agents. Moreover, the ACCESS CONTROLLER is used in order to 
restrict the access to the system resources. The SANDBOX pattern can implement the 
CHECKPOINT pattern. The AGENT AUTHENTICATOR can use the SESSION 
pattern in order to store credentials of the agent. Besides, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY 
GENERATION and CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY EXCHANGE is needed as a basis for 
further cryptographic actions. 
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4. A Set of Patterns  
Name: AGENCY GUARD (AG) 
Intent: Provide a single, non-bypassable, point of access to the agency. The 
AGENCY GUARD defines a structure that makes unauthorized access to the agency 
difficult.    
Context: A number of agencies exist in a network. Agents from different agencies 
must communicate or exchange information. This involves the movement of some 
agents from one agency to another or requests from agents belonging to an agency for 
resources belonging to another agency.  
Problem: Many malicious agents will try to gain unauthorized access to agencies. If a 
malicious agent gains such an access, it can disclose, alter or destroy the data resided 
in the agency. Additionally, depending on the level of access the malicious agent 
gains, it might be able to completely shut off the agency or exhaust the agency’s 
computational resources resulting in a denial of service to authorised agents of the 
agency. The problem becomes worse if many “back-doors” are available in an agency 
enabling malicious agents to attack the agency from many places. On the other hand, 
not all agents trying to gain access to the agency must be treated as malicious, but 
access should be granted based on the security policy of the agency. 
Forces: 
• The agencies provide access to subsequent resources. All of the corresponding 
resources have to be protected accordingly. 
• More interfaces increase the flexibility and usability of an agent system, 
however, this also could result in duplicate code. 
• A single interface can become complex when there are different types of 
authorization.  
 
Solution: There must be a single point of access to the agency. When an agent 
(Requester Agent) wishes to access resources of an Agency or even move to this 
agency, its request are forwarded through the AGENCY GUARD that is responsible 
to grant or deny the access requests according to the security policy of the agency. 
The AGENCY GUARD is the only point of access in an agency and it is always non-
bypassable, meaning all the access requests are going through it.  
 
Social Dependencies: A graphical representation involving the actors of the pattern 
and their social dependencies is shown in Figure 3. The Agency depends on the 
AGENCY GUARD to grant/deny access to the agency. The AGENT GUARD grants 
/ denies access according to the security policy. To obtain the security policy the 
AGENCY GUARD depends on the Agency. The Requester agent depends on the 
AGENCY GUARD to obtain access to the agency. For the AGENCY GUARD to 
provide access to the agency, a request must be sent from the Requester agent.  
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Figure 3: The AGENCY GUARD Dependencies 
 
Consequences:  
+ Only the guard should be aware of the security policy of the agency, and it is 
the only entity that must be notified if security policy changes (Not all the 
agents in the agency) 
+ Only the guard must be tested for correct enforcement of the agency’s 
security policy. 
+ Only one point of access to the agency, not many backdoors. 
− Only one point of access to the agency can degrade performance of the 
agency 
− Only point of security, if it fails the security of the whole agency is in danger. 
 
Related Patterns: The AGENCY GUARD has concepts of both the PROXY [Nor96] 
and the EMBASSY patterns [Kol01]. In addition, the AGENCY GUARD depends on 
the AGENT AUTHENTICATION pattern, in order to authenticate (verify the 
owner’s identity) the agent requesting access. On the other hand, even if the agent is 
not authenticated the agency might decide to allow it to move to the agency but 
restrict its actions. For this reason the SANBOXING pattern can be used. In 
traditional terms the concept of an AGENCY GUARD is related to the SINGLE 
POINT OF ACCESS [Yod97] and it is referred to as the REFERENCE MONITOR 
[Amo94, Fer02] 
 
Name: AGENT AUTHENTICATOR (AA) 
 
Intent: Provide authentication services to the agency.  
 
Context: Agents send requests to gain access to an agency or to the resources of an 
agency; different than the one they belong. To allow access they must be 
authenticated, i.e. they must provide information about the identity of their owners. 
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Problem: Many malicious agents will try to masquerade their identity when 
requesting access to an agency. If such an agent is granted access to the agency, it 
might try to breach the agency’s security. In addition, even if the malicious agent fails 
to cause problems in the security of the agency, the agency will loose trust of the 
agent/agency the malicious agent masqueraded the identity. 
 
Forces:  
 
• Not all agents have to be authenticated or need all privileges. 
• Both agencies and agents should be able to determine the identity of each other. 
• Only weak authentication mechanisms, such as passwords, will not work in 
agent environments. 
• Public authentication algorithms are widely tested and usually they are 
cryptanalysed. On the other hand, secret algorithms can (and usually will) be 
reverse-engineered. 
• Cryptography will cost you. More secure mechanisms usually lead to more 
expensive systems. 
 
Solution: Agents have to be authenticated by the agency. By authenticating the agent; 
the AGENCY GUARD makes sure it comes from an owner that is trustworthy for the 
agency. Each agent’s owner and each agency have a public/private key pair.  The 
AGENT AUTHENTICATOR can authenticate the agent on two cases:  Firstly, when 
the agent is digitally signed with the owner’s public key and secondly when the agent 
is digitally signed with the key of the agency that the agent resides. In the second 
case, the agent’s agency would have authenticated the agent either if the owner signed 
the agent or if the agent was signed by the sending agency. In order for the second 
case to work, mutual trust must be involved between the sending and receiving 
agencies (each agency can be set up so it has a list of “trusted” agencies). In case that 
the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR does not trust the agency from which the agent 
comes from, it can reject the agent, or accept it with minimal privileges 
 
Social Dependencies: The graphical representation of the pattern dependencies is 
shown in Figure 4. The Requester Agent depends on the AGENCY GUARD to obtain 
access to the agency. However, the AGENCY GUARD cannot authenticate the 
requester agent by itself, so it depends on the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR to 
authenticate the agent. As a result, the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR receives a 
request for authentication from the AGENCY GUARD when needed. In order for the 
AGENT AUTHENTICATOR to authenticate the Requester Agent, the requester 
agent should provide evidence of its digital signature.   The AGENT 
AUTHENTICATOR has to send the notification to the AGENCY GUARD when the 
agent is authenticated.  
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Figure 4: The AGENT AUTHENTICATOR Dependencies 
 
 
Consequences:  
+ Authentication concerns are only dealt once. It is not necessary to make 
the agents of the system more complex by providing each one of those 
with an authentication mechanism 
+ Ensures that an agent is authenticated before actually request a resource of 
the agency 
+ During the implementation of the system, only the AGENT 
AUTHENTICATOR must be checked for assurance. 
− A single point of failure. If the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR fails, the 
security of the whole agency is in danger 
 
Related Patterns: This pattern has some relations to patterns of the pattern language 
for cryptographic key generation [Leh02]. For example, a CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY 
GENERATION is required. It is also important to have an appropriate 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY EXCHANGE. Furthermore, a SESSION can be used to 
store the credentials of an agent for subsequent requests [Yod97]. Moreover, applying 
the SANDBOX pattern can be used to restrict the set of resources available to the 
agent. 
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Name: SANDBOX  
 
Intent: Allow the agency to execute non-authorised agents in a secure manner. 
 
Context: An agent requests to move to an agency but it is unable to provide 
authentication certificates. This can be either the case when the agent  is not 
authenticated or it has been authenticated by an untrusted agency. 
 
Problem: An agency is more likely exposed to a huge number of malicious agents 
that will try to gain unauthorised access. Although the agency will try to prevent 
access to those agents, it is possible that some of them might be able to gain access. 
Thus it is necessary for the agency to operate in a manner that will minimise the 
damage that can be caused by an unauthorised agent that gains access. In addition, 
some unauthorized agents might be allowed access by the agency in order to provide 
services the agency’s agents cannot provide. Thus, the agency must be cautious to 
accept such unauthorised agents without put in danger its security. 
 
Forces: 
 
• An agent might need specific privileges to perform its task. However, it should 
not be allowed more rights than necessary. 
• Not all agents are “security aware” and might act against the system’s global 
policy. 
 
Solution: Execute the agent in an isolated environment that has full control over the 
agent’s ingoing and outgoing messages.  Implementing such a sandboxing principle 
prevents any malicious code from doing something is not authorised to do. The code 
is allowed to destroy anything within the restricted environment but it cannot touch 
anything outside.  The concept is similar to the Java programming language's use of a 
virtual machine environment and the chroot environment in UNIX. Malicious code 
cannot do anything without first interacting with the operating system. Thus, 
SANBOX observes all system calls made by the code and compare them to the 
agency-defined policy. If any violations occur, the agency can shut down the 
suspicious agent.   
 
Social Dependencies: The graphical representation of the pattern dependencies is 
shown in Figure 5. The agency depends on the SANDBOX agent for observing and 
controlling the agent’s activities, and the SANDBOX depends on the Agency to know 
adopted policies.  
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Figure 5: The SANDBOX Dependencies 
 
Consequences:  
+ Agents not authorised but valuable for the agency can be executed without 
compromising the security of the agency 
+ Agency can identify possible attacks (by observing the actions of the agents 
in the SANDBOX) 
− Some computational resources of the agency might be taken for non-useful 
actions (when non-useful agents are sandboxed) 
− Introduce an extra layer of complexity on the agency  
 
Related Patterns: A CHECKPOINT should be implemented within the SANDBOX 
in order to keep track of the exceptional actions and to decide what actions have to be 
taken based on the severity of the violation of the security policy (which defines what 
is allowed and what isn’t). The SANBOX pattern is related to a similarly-named Java 
pattern [Jaw00].  
 
 
Name: ACCESS CONTROLLER (AC) 
 
Intent: Allow the agency to provide access to its resources according to its security 
policy. 
 
Context: Many different agents exist in an agency. Those agents most likely will 
require access to some of the agency’s resources in order to achieve their operational 
goals. However, different agents might have different access permissions and are 
allowed access only to specific resources of the agency.  
 
Problem: Agents belonging to an agency might try to access resources that are not 
allowed. Allowing this to happen might lead to serious problems such as disclosure of 
private information or alteration of sensitive data. In addition, more likely different 
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security privileges will be applied to different agents on the agency. The agency 
should take into account its security policy and consider each access request 
individually. How can the agency make sure that agents access resources that are 
allowed to access?  
 
Forces: 
 
• It is unlikely that the access control facilities of all internal resources are 
activated and configured appropriately. In particular, out-of-the box installations 
offer standard services that can be misused by malicious agents. Even if there are 
access restrictions it is unlikely that they are consistent, especially when more 
than one administrator is involved and there are no “global” guidelines. 
• Even worse, we can assume that most internal resources are not hardened: 
experience shows that patches aren’t applied in time and that many, often 
unneeded services are running 
• Furthermore, it might happen that attacks can’t even be detected, as one cannot 
ensure that the audit facilities of the internal resources are activated and 
configured appropriately. 
 
Solution: An ACCESS CONTROLLER exists in the agency. The ACCESS 
CONTROLLER controls access to each resource. Thus, when an agent requests 
access to a resource, the request is forwarded to the ACCESS CONTROLLER. The 
ACCESS CONTROLLER checks the security policy and determines whether the 
access request should be approved or rejected. If the access request is approved the 
ACCESS CONTROLLER forwards the request to the RESOURCE MANAGER.  
 
Social dependencies: The graphical representation of the pattern dependencies is 
shown in Figure 6. The Requester Agent depends on the Resource Manager for the 
resource, and the Agency depends on the ACCESS CONTROLLER for checking the 
request.  ACCESS CONTROLLER depends on the Agency for receiving the security 
policies and for forwarding the request, which is forwarded to the Resource Manager 
in case it is approved.   
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Figure 6: The ACCESS CONTROLLER Dependencies 
 
 
Consequences:  
+ Agency’s resources are used only by agents allowed to access them 
+ Different policies can be used for accessing different resources 
− One point of attack, if this fails the system access control system fails 
 
Related Patterns The ACCESS CONTROLLER pattern has been inspired by the 
ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL pattern presented by Fernandez [Fer01]. It is 
very similar (it can be thought of as a specialisation) to the AGENCY GUARD, but it 
focuses on access at resources within the agency rather than access to the agency.  
5. Applying the Patterns 
To illustrate the use of the proposed set of patterns we are employing the electronic 
Single Assessment Process (eSAP) case study [Mou03b], an agent-based health and 
social care information system to deliver an integrated assessment of health and social 
care needs of older people2. In previous work [Mou03] we have analysed the security 
issues of the system using the Tropos methodology and we have identified the need 
for the system to perform authentication and access control checks. Figure 7 
illustrates how the AUTHENTICATOR, the ACCESS CONTROLLER and the 
AGENCY GUARD patterns can be used to satisfy those security goals of the eSAP 
                                                           
2 The eSAP has been extensively described in the literature [Mou02, Mou02b, Mou03, 
Mou03b] 
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system. Let us consider the scenario that an Older Person agent (requester agent) 
wishes to obtain information about their Care Plan (resource).   
 
 
 
Figure 7: An example of using the patterns 
 
To obtain such information the Older Person depends on the eSAP Guard agent to 
grant them access to the system. After the eSAP Guard grants access to the Older 
Person (by obtaining an authentication clearance from the Authenticator agent) the 
Older Person depends on the Care Plan Manager agent to receive information about 
their Care Plan. The Care Plan Manager forwards the care plan request to the 
ACCESS CONTROLLER agent, which depends on the eSAP System agent to obtain 
the security policy.  
Using the above-mentioned patterns the developer is able to the agents needed to 
satisfy the system’s security goals fast and efficiently.  Besides, he can delegate the 
responsibility of the system’s security goals to the actors defined by those patterns. 
For example, the eSAP Guard agent checks each agent that tries to access the system, 
the Authenticator agent satisfies the security goal by authenticating each agent that 
tries to access the system, and the ACESS CONTROLLER  controls access to the 
resources (care plans) of the system.  
6. Conclusions 
As mentioned in the Introduction, security is usually considered after the definition of 
a multi-agent system leading to the development of systems afflicted with security 
vulnerabilities. A promising solution to this problem is to apply the pattern approach 
within the security domain.   
In this paper we advocated for the development of security patterns that can be 
applied in the development of secure agent-based system.  We have also argued that 
such patterns must be based on agent-oriented concepts, such as goals and social 
dependencies, which are common in agent-based systems. Towards this direction, we 
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have proposed a set of patterns based on such concepts. Our patterns could be well 
integrated in the existing landscape of security patterns.  
Currently, we are working to expand the proposed set of patterns into a pattern 
language by providing more patterns related to secure agencies. 
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